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TN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
LORETO ROJAS SALGADO, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20060070-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on two counts of 
distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a 
public parking lot, a first degree felony (R. 119). This Court 
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3 (2) (j) (West 2004) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court plainly err in submitting the case 
to the jury or did defense counsel render ineffective assistance 
of counsel for not filing a motion for directed verdict, where 
the evidence and its reasonable inferences, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, sufficed to establish that 
defendant unlawfully distributed a controlled substance within 
1000 feet of a public parking lot? 
1 
To prevail on a claim of plain error, defendant must 
demonstrate that the trial court erred, that the error should 
have been obvious, and that, absent the error, he had a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). In reviewing a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine 
whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, 
whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. 
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). This claim presents 
a question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying 
trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 11 16-17, 12 P.3d 
92. 
2. Did the trial court err by permitting the State to amend 
count II of the information before trial to allege that defendant 
distributed oxycodone rather than Lortab, both of which are 
"controlled substances" within the meaning of the law? 
Whether the trial court properly permitted an information to 
be amended presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness, 
with some deference accorded to the trial court for its factual 
findings. State v. Bush, 2001 UT App 10, 110, 47 P. 3d 69 
(citations omitted). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, •- "Ves are 
dispositive in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of distribution of a 
controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public parking lot (R. 
1-2). A jury convicted him as charged (R. 100-01). The court 
sentenced defendant to two concurrent five-to-life prison terms 
(R. 111). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 123). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Sean Henderson, a recovering prescription :irug addict, was 
working with the Weber Morgan Narcotics Strike Force as a 
confidential informal it :i i I t h e s p r i n g o -• >. 
140: 59). Pursuant to a contract with the Strike Force, Sean 
agreed to make his best efforts to secure four "prosecutable 
[drug] charges;" the State, in turn, would recommend that he 
serve county jail time with work release iii lieu of prison for 
charges currently pending against him (R. 139: 157). 
Sean and defendant had both worked at a Holiday Inn, where 
Sean's pill addiction was apparently common knowledge (R. I10r 
59). At the motel, defendant let Sean know that she could obtain 
prescription pills for him (Id.). During the first half of 2004, 
he would tell her how much money he had, and she would supply him 
with prescription pills (Id. at 59-60). He estimated he had 
bought pills from her at least 20 times (Id. at 66). 
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In early April, working with the Strike Force, Sean set up 
two monitored drug buys from defendant. Both unfolded in 
essentially the same way. Sean met officers near a Chevron 
station in West Haven, where both he and the vehicle he was 
driving were searched. Sean was given $100 in prerecorded bills 
and wired with an electronic audio monitoring device (R. 139: 
159, 163, 176; R. 140: 11, 13, 68). One officer got in Sean's 
vehicle with him, accompanying him throughout the transaction; 
another positioned himself nearby to videotape the transaction; 
still others were in the area, observing events unfold (R. 139: 
162, 167-69; R. 140: 50-53, 123-25). 
For both buys, Sean first contacted defendant by phone, told 
her how much money he had and what pills he wanted (R. 139: 164). 
The first time, accompanied by agent Dickson, Sean drove to the 
Chevron station in a jacked-up truck (R. 140: 124). Defendant 
arrived at the Chevron parking lot moments later, stopping one 
"stall" away from them (Id. at 124, 126). Sean got out of the 
truck and into the passenger seat of defendant's car (Id. at 
124). Agent Dickson testified that he leaned from the front 
passenger seat over the center console of the truck, looking down 
into defendant's vehicle (Id. at 126, 135-36). From this vantage 
point, he observed a hand-to-hand transaction (Id. at 125, 137). 
Sean quickly returned to the truck and deposited a baggie with 
pills in it on the center console (Id.). The two then drove 
away. 
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The second transaction unfolded in much the same way, except 
that Sean was drivi ng a "normal" car, and the transaction "•;,'.'; 
occurred as Sean, standing in the parking lot, leaned into the 
defendant'' s driver' s side window. Ii 1 tl: i:i s instai ice, Agent • 
Dickson did not actually observe the hand-to-hand transfer (Id. 
at 130, 138). Dickson did, however, testify that when Sean left 
his presence, he had $100 and that when he returned, he had a 
baggie of pills in his hand, which he put on the console as soon 
as he got back into the car (Id. at 130). 
A chemist at the Utah Bureau of Forensic Services analyzed 
pills from both drug buys. The first drug submission, arising 
from the first buy, was tested i n May of 2005. It consisted of 
two different pills, one of which was oxycodone -. . - .4, 
129). The second sample, arising from the second buy, was tested 
in November of 2005. It consisted of 32 pillo \ .3 
different kinds, one of which was oxycodone (Id. at 125, 130). 
The chemist testified that the dela> :i testing the p:i ] I s from .• 
the second buy did not affect their chemical composition (Id. at 
133) . 
Based on this evidence, the jury convicted defendant on two 
counts of distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet 
of a public parking lot, a first degree felony (R. " ). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the trial court plainly erred in 
submitting the case to the jury and that her counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing a motion for 
directed verdict because the State failed to adduce evidence that 
the Chevron parking lot in which the drug transaction occurred 
was a "public parking lot" within the meaning of the drug 
enhancement statute. This claim fails because evidence is 
sufficient if both the evidence and its reasonable inferences, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdictf 
establish that the Chevron parking lot was "public." Here, the 
jury reasonably inferred that a business selling products to the 
public maintains a parking lot for the specific purpose of 
accommodating the entry of members of the public. No more is 
necessary to establish a public parking lot. 
Defendant also argues that the court abused its discretion 
by denying his motions to dismiss or continue. This argument 
fails at the outset because defendant made no such motions. 
Rather, the State moved to amend count II of the information from 
Lortab to oxycodone, and defendant objected, arguing he would 
suffer prejudice as a result. An information can be amended any 
time until the verdict so long as "the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced." Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d). In this 
case, where defendant was unable to articulate any prejudice, 
where both Lortab and oxycodone are controlled substances, and 
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where the defense was that defendant met the confidential 
informant to reimburse her for money he had borrowed, whether the 
drug was Lortab or oxycodone is inconsequential, leaving 
defendant's "substantial rights'' unaffected. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR 
IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY-
AND DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT 
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE 
EVIDENCE AND ITS FAIR INFERENCES 
ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT 
DISTRIBUTED DRUGS IN A PARKING LOT 
OPEN TO THE PUBLIC 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not 
unilaterally issuing a directed verdict because the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that the Chevron parking lot was a "public" 
parking lot. See Br. of Aplt. at 18-22. Because defendant did 
not preserve the issue at trial by filing a motion for a directed 
verdict, she relies on a plain error argument on appeal. See 
State v. Holqate, 2000 UT 74, 116, 10 P.3d 346 (generally, in 
order to preserve issue for appeal, defendant must raise 
sufficiency claim by proper motion). "[T]o establish plain 
error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and 
second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that 
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. 
at 117. Only after the defendant convincingly makes an initial 
7 
showing of insufficiency will the appellate court "determine 
whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental 
that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id. at 
118. 
At the outset, defendant's argument is inadequately briefed. 
While defendant cites and discusses several cases reversed for 
insufficient evidence, she wholly fails to apply their teachings 
to the facts of this case. See Br. of Aplt. at 19-21. Moreover, 
her discussion of this specific case consists of less than a 
paragraph and is wholly conclusory, incorporating no legal 
analysis.1 Id. at 21-22. "[R]ule 24(a)(9) requires not just 
bald citation to authority but development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 
P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Absent any meaningful analysis, this 
Court should decline to reach the merits of defendant's claim. 
See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 13, 974 P.2d 269; State 
v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 1 31, 973 P.2d 404; State v. Price, 827 
P.2d 247, 250 (Utah App. 1992).2 
1
 Defendant's fact-specific, substantive argument states in 
its entirety: "It is undisputed that there were no witnesses who 
testified that the Chevron parking lot was a public lot. The 
prosecutor did not ask and the trial court did not take judicial 
notice of that essential fact. The evidence was only speculative 
that it was a public parking lot, and a criminal conviction 
cannot be grounded upon speculation." Br. of Aplt. at 21-22. 
2
 The issue is waived for an additional reason. Had 
defendant wished the jury to apply some particular definition of 
"public parking lot," she should have requested such an 
instruction from the court. The record reveals no such request. 
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Moreover, even on the merits, defendant's claim fails 
because the public nature of the parking lot is an inferential 
fact that the jury reasonably drew from undisputed evidence that 
the drug sale transpired in a Chevron parking lot. It is common 
knowledge that businesses maintain parking lots in order to 
accommodate members of the public who choose to avail themselves 
of the services offered by the businesses. A parking lot 
associated with a gas station is thus "public" because it is 
"common to all or many" and "not restricted to any particular 
class of the community." Black's Law Dictionary 1104 (5th ed. 
1979). Utah courts have embraced this view of public parking 
lots. .See Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2002 UT 30, OT 2, 29, 44 
P.3d 767 (describing the back parking lot of a bar); Hansen v. 
America Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, % 2, 96 P.3d 950 (describing a 
parking lot owned by a strip mall as a "public parking lot")/ 
accord United States v. Biqsby, 145 Fed.Appx. 595, 596 (9th Cir. 
2005) (describing the parking lot of a closed business as a 
"public parking lot"); Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 716-718 
(Tex. App. 2003) (repeatedly describing parking lot between two 
businesses as a "public parking lot). Some courts have 
specifically referred to a gas station parking lot as a "public 
parking lot." See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 34 P.3d 1119, 1125 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2001); State v. Robinson, 206 A.2d 779, 780 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965). Absent any evidence that the public 
was restricted in its use of this parking lot, the jury was well 
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within its prerogative in inferring that the gas station parking 
lot in which the drugs were sold was a "public parking lot." 
Consequently, the trial court did not plainly err in submitting 
the case to the jury. 
Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move for a directed verdict. See Br. of Aplt. at 15-
18. Because a motion for a directed verdict would have been 
futile, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by 
failing to file the motion. See State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 
295, 1 22, 55 P.3d 1147 (stating that "'failure of counsel to 
make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does 
not constitute ineffective assistance.'")(citation omitted). 
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance and plain error thus 
both fail. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE 
COURT DENIED HIS MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR CONTINUE FOR FAILURE TO GIVE 
ADEQUATE EXPERT WITNESS NOTICE IS 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD; RATHER, 
THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED THE STATE'S 
MOTION, TO WHICH DEFENDANT 
OBJECTED, TO AMEND THE INFORMATION 
BEFORE TRIAL, A CHANGE THAT DID NOT 
PREJUDICE DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIAL 
RIGHTS 
Defendant argues that because the State violated the 
statutory notice provision governing expert witnesses, the trial 
court should have granted his motions to dismiss and to continue. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 3-4. This argument fails because defendant 
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moved neither to dismiss nor to continue. Nothing in the record 
before this Court suggests that he filed such motions.3 Indeed, 
defendant's failure to seek a continuance negates any claim of 
surprise and waives his issue on appeal. See, e.g.. State v. 
Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Utah App. 1989). 
The record does reveal that defendant objected to the 
State's motion to amend the information. See R. 139: 3, 82-90. 
However, he never mentioned the expert witness statute, much less 
its notice provision. The substantive thrust of his argument 
below was that if the trial court permitted the State to amend 
the information right before trial, he would suffer prejudice. 
See Id. at 82-90. 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, makes clear the 
State's right to amend an information: 
The court may permit an indictment or 
information to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense 
is charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d). Even if defendant had properly preserved 
this issue, under the factual circumstances here, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment because 
defendant's "substantial rights" were not affected by changing 
the information from Lortab to oxycodone. 
3
 The relevant citations in the statement of issues of 
appellant's brief lead back only to the State's motion to amend 
and defendant's objections to it. See Br. of Aplt. at 3-4. The 
summary of argument and the argument itself contain no record 
citations at all. See Br. of Aplt. at 11-12; 22-30). 
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Defendant was originally charged with two counts of 
distribution of a controlled substance — the first count for 
oxycodone and the second for Lortab (R. 1-2). After the 
information was filed, a chemist from the Utah Bureau of Forensic 
Services tested the pills supporting the first count, confirming 
that one was oxycodone, a controlled substance (R. 139: 130). 
The parties stipulated to this lab test result (Id. at 84, 90). 
The chemist did not receive any pills relating to the second 
count, which was charged as Lortab. 
A week prior to trial, defense counsel notified the State 
that the second sample had never been tested. The State, 
accordingly, sent the second set of pills to the same chemist, 
who determined that the pill previously thought to be Lortab was 
in fact oxycodone (Id. at 84, 130-31). When the State received 
this news just before trial, it immediately informed defense 
counsel (Id. at 85). On the morning of trial, the State then 
moved to amend the information on Count II from distribution of 
Lortab to distribution of oxycodone, both of which are controlled 
substances (Id. at 3). Defendant objected to the amendment, 
claiming prejudice (Id.). 
The trial court permitted the amendment but also probed 
defendant's allegation of prejudice. During an extended 
discussion, the court was unable to elicit from defense counsel 
the precise nature of the prejudice arising from amending the 
information. The court then suggested: 
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So you think you might be able to show there 
was confusion somewhere about exactly what 
this drug was that might raise reasonable 
doubt in the jury's mind. . . if you had been 
able to properly prepare and perhaps 
challenge [the State, W^]hy did you charge it 
as Lortab then if you're now claiming it was 
oxycodone[?'] 
(Id. at 87-88). The court noted, "I'm not sure it's two cents' 
worth of difference because they're both illegal drugs. . . but 
. . . when a defense is trying to raise questions about the 
validity of the State's evidence, they should be given a free 
hand to raise every possible reasonable issue" (Id. at 90-91). 
At the court's suggestion, then, the chemist and one other 
witness testified about the "confusion" that caused the substance 
to be charged initially as Lortab (Id. at 89). 
Nothing about this course of events suggests that the court 
abused its discretion in amending the information. First, both 
Lortab and oxycodone are controlled substances. The State's 
burden was to prove only that defendant distributed a controlled 
substance. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Defendant 
would be as culpable for selling one drug as the other. Second, 
the defense in this case was that the confidential informant owed 
defendant $400, called her to tell her he had $100, and met her 
to pay that money back (R. 139: 110, 115; R. 140: 16). Pursuant 
to such a defense, whether the pills were Lortab or oxycodone is 
inconsequential. Finally, the lack of prejudice is plainly 
attested to by counsel's inability to articulate in a specific 
and meaningful way the impact of the change on defendant's 
13 
"substantial rights. "4 For all of these reasons, the claim 
fails. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
permitting the State to amend the information. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on two counts of distribution of a controlled 
substance within 1000 feet of a public parking lot, a first 
degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _OJ_ day of October, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
4
 Counsel first argued that a change would prejudice 
defendant because "we've prepared our defense surrounding the 
fact the State has called Lortab in count 2" (R. 139: 82). The 
State responded that an information could be amended at any time 
until the verdict and that, in any event, both Lortab and 
oxycodone were controlled substances, each of which could support 
an unlawful distribution charge (Id.). The court then asked 
defendant what disadvantage the change would engender (Id. at 
83). Counsel responded that if the information for count II 
remained Lortab, he could call an expert witness to testify that 
the pill was not Lortab (Id.). The court replied, "[I]'m 
wondering what is the problem other than the possibility that 
. . . your client would be convicted of possessing oxycodone 
rather than Lortab" (Id.). Defense counsel suggested that the 
delay in testing the drug might be problematic, but conceded that 
"[w]e haven't had a chance to consult with experts to see how it 
would affect our defense" (Id. at 84; accord id. at 87). 
Unconvinced, the court reiterated, "Tell me what you would have 
done differently" (Id. at 87). Counsel replied, "[W]e could have 
consulted with experts to see what our defense would be. We 
wouldn't know what it would be until we talked to the expert" 
(Id.). Defendant's responses clearly do not establish the firm 
likelihood of a different outcome absent the alleged error in 
permitting the amendment. 
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